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Abstract
In a Diamond-type overlapping-generations setting public debt issuance places
no burden on future generations including those who repay the debt if prices and
wages are ¯xed and unemployment occurs in the periods in which public bonds are
issued and repaid. Whether the collected fund is spent on government purchases
or transfers to the present generation, public bond issuance stimulates aggregate
demand and creates additional employment of future generations, which yields ad-
ditional income that is large enough to cover their tax burden. This property is
true whether the debt is repaid by children or grandchildren.
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1 Introduction
Public debt burden is a long-discussed issue in the literature. For example, Tobin (1980,
p. 49) states:
Do government de¯cits absorb private saving? Does public debt diminish
private demand for stocks of productive capital assets? Can the burden of
current government expenditure be shifted to future generations? These are
old questions. Today they are once more in the forefront of economic contro-
versy. Few issues of economic theory and fact evoke such polar disagreement.
The contesting views carry radically divergent implications for public ¯scal
and ¯nancial policy.
This issue has become more relevant especially after the ¯nancial crisis of 2008. Many
countries face serious economic turndown and are forced to expand ¯scal spending by
issuing public bonds, which provokes serious worries about debt burdens on future gen-
erations. Particularly in Japan serious stagnation continues for twenty years and a huge
amount of public debt has accumulated. We reconsider this issue in the presence of de-
mand shortage and involuntary unemployment and show that there is no public debt
burden on future generations.
Public debt is widely believed to place burdens on future generations in the literature.
Using an overlapping-generations model with ¯nitely-lived agents, for example, Diamond
(1965) ¯nds that internal debt reduces capital accumulation (if the saddle-point stability is
valid) and deteriorates steady-state welfare (if the economy is dynamically e±cient). Blan-
chard (1985) and Weil (1989) obtain similar results in alternative overlapping-generations
models with in¯nitely-lived agents.1 They ¯nd that public debt makes future generations
worse o® on the dynamically e±cient path since it creates persistent income transfers
1Blanchard (1985) assumes that each agent anytime faces a common and constant instantaneous
probability of death and thus all generations have the same average rest of life. Weil (1989) does not
take account of the death probability. However, since the role of ¯nite lifetime is negligible in the present
context, as Buiter (1988) discusses, these two analyses have basically the same implication.
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from future generations to current generations.2 In these models public debt burden is
due to intergenerational redistribution.3 While they consider the case of full employ-
ment, we use an overlapping-generations model with involuntary unemployment since a
government more likely issues public bonds under stagnation so as to ¯nance extra ¯scal
spending and create new demand. In this setting we show that there is no public debt
burden on future generations although the economy is dynamically e±cient.4
There are not many studies that explore the implication of public debt in the presence
of demand shortage and involuntary unemployment. Among those, Tobin (1980) suggests
that a helicopter drop of government bonds raises demand for current consumption and
reduces unemployment whereas Modigliani (1961) argues that government bonds place
burdens on future generations even in the presence of unemployment. However, both of
them use ad hoc models without rational agent behavior. Rankin (1986) uses a Diamond-
type overlapping-generations model with nominal price rigidity and analyze public debt
2Lopez-Garcia (2008) obtains basically the same result as Diamond (1965) in a model with endogenous
labor supply. By developing an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations and production
externalities, Saint-Paul (1992) shows that public debt reduces the growth rate and the welfare of some
future generations. The implication of Diamond (1965), Blanchard (1985), and Weil (1989) has been
extensively investigated in various directions. See e.g., Drazen (1978) for human capital accumulation,
Persson (1985) for an open economy, Lapan and Enders (1990) for endogenous fertility, and Sen (2002)
for monopolistic competition in the commodity market.
3There are other sources that make Ricardian equivalence invalid. They are e.g. capital market
imperfections and distortionary taxation. See Bernheim (1987) and Romer (2005, ch. 11) for the condition
of Ricardian equivalence to be invalid.
4Since neither population growth nor physical capital depreciation is assumed, the equilibrium path
is dynamically e±cient in our model. With full employment public debt issuance makes future gener-
ations worse o® on the dynamically e±cient path, as mentioned above. On the dynamically ine±cient
path, however, public debt issuance may make future generations better o® because it remedies capital
overaccumulation (see Diamond 1965 and Tirole 1985). Chalk (2000) and Rankin and Ro±a (2003) ex-
amine whether there is a path toward the dynamically ine±cient steady state where the government rolls
over the debt forever, implying that future generations are not worse o® on that path. In an uncertain
economy setting, Bohn (1995), Ball et al. (1998), and Blanchard and Weil (2001) distinguish the rate of
return on public bonds from that on physical capital to ¯nd a positive probability of de¯cit sustainability
on the dynamically e±cient path.
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burden. He shows that in the presence of excess supply in the commodity and labor
markets, viz. \Keynesian unemployment" in Malinvaud's (1977) terminology, a perma-
nent increase in public debt raises steady-state output and welfare under some reasonable
conditions, including saddle-point stability.
The model of this paper has a similar structure as that of Rankin (1986) but di®ers
from it in the following two aspects. First, we take into account employment of not only
the young but also the old. Second, while Rankin focuses on the steady state only, we
analyze the e®ect of a temporary increase in bonds in the transitional state. This extension
enables us to distinguish the following three policies: (i) public debt is redeemed only by
taxing on the current young, (ii) additional taxes are levied on not only the current young
but also the generations that are not yet born, and (iii) de¯cit-covering bonds are issued
to redeem the current bonds.5 We show that in any of these three cases there is no debt
burden on future generations. Even if the old are employed due to ¯scal spending and
the young are taxed, employment of the young eventually increases enough to cover the
tax payment, yielding no public debt burden on the young.
When analyzing public debt burdens on future generations in the presence of unem-
ployment, Ogawa (2005) employs a model ¶a la Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989). He
shows that whether or not public debt issuance makes future generations worse o® depends
on the amount of outstanding bonds. In that model all generations, including the current
generation, coexist even in the future and hence a government can anytime redistribute
debt burdens through appropriate taxation. In the Diamond model, in contrast, such
redistribution is infeasible because the current generation does not exist when imposing
a tax. Such a di®erence in the demographic structure between the two types of models
leads to a di®erent conclusion. This paper ¯nds that public debt issuance never makes
future generations worse o® in the Diamond model.
Steigum (2001), Kaas and von Thadden (2004), and Josten (2006) take account of
real wage rigidity due to the bargaining power of trade unions. Among them, Steigum
(2001) shows that debt burdens on future generations that arise from postponement of
5We explicitly introduce equities whereas Rankin (1986) assumes that ¯rm revenues are always trans-
ferred to the old. This di®erence does not alter the main implication.
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the labor income tax is larger with union power than without it. Kass and von Thad-
den (2004) compares unemployment dynamics under balanced and unbalanced budgets.
Josten (2006) uses an endogenous growth model with production externalities and ¯nds
that an increase in the debt-to-capital ratio forces the government to raise the labor in-
come tax, which worsens unemployment and decreases economic growth. Whereas they
consider structural unemployment, we treat involuntary unemployment due to demand
shortage. Using a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model with short-run nominal
price rigidity, Ganelli (2005) considers a permanent tax cut ¯nanced by debt issuance
that is maintained even after nominal prices fully adjust. He concludes that it leads to
current account de¯cits and decreases long-run consumption in the home country. We in
contrast examine the e®ect of debt issuance only in the period where nominal prices are
¯xed and ¯nd that consumption of future generations does not decline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure
of the model and formulates the dynamics. Section 3 discusses the main implication of
public debt burdens in the presence of Keynesian unemployment. Section 4 extends the
analysis to the case of de¯cit-covering bond issuance. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Individuals live for two periods and two generations coexist at any point in time. The
population size of each generation is normalized to unity. Nominal price Pt and nom-
inal wage Wt are ¯xed and Keynesian unemployment occurs at least in the period in
which bonds are issued and the period in which they are repaid. Note that the following
argument holds whether prices and wages are rigid or °exible in the subsequent periods.6
Utility of an individual born in period t depends on consumption when young and old,
6Rankin (1986) assumes nominal prices and wages to be ¯xed in all periods since he treats the e®ect
of bond issuance in steady state. In contrast, we analyze the e®ect on economic variables in the period
in which the bonds are issued and the period in which bonds are repaid in the presence of unemploy-
ment. Hence price/wage rigidities are required only in the relevant periods. See Ono (2001) for a recent
discussion about public debt burdens under a liquidity trap and price/wage sluggishness.
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cyt and c
o
t+1 respectively, and real money holdings mt(= Mt=Pt) at the end of her youth
{i.e.,
Ut = u(c
y
t ) + v(mt) + µu(c
o
t+1); (1)
where u0 > 0; u00 < 0; v0 > 0; v00 < 0; µ > 0:
Given real wage wt (or wt+1), each individual earns wage income wtl
y
t (or wt+1l
o
t+1) by
supplying labor lyt (or l
o
t+1) and pays lump-sum tax-cum-subsidy z
y
t (or z
o
t+1) when young
(or old). She accumulates three kinds of interest-bearing assets, viz. public bond bt+1,
physical capital kt+1, and equity ºt+1, when young, and receives returns (1 + rt+1)(bt+1 +
kt+1 + ºt+1) when old, where rt+1 is the real interest rate. The budget equations when
young and old are respectively
cyt +mt + (bt+1 + kt+1 + ºt+1) = wtl
y
t ¡ zyt ; (2)
cot+1 =
1
1 + ¼t+1
mt + (1 + rt+1)(bt+1 + kt+1 + ºt+1) + wt+1l
o
t+1 ¡ zot+1; (3)
where ¼t+1 represents the in°ation rate. These two equations reduce to the lifetime budget
equation:
cyt +
Rt+1
1 +Rt+1
mt +
1
1 + rt+1
cot+1 = ­t; (4)
where Rt+1 and ­t are respectively the nominal interest rate and the capitalized value of
lifetime disposable income:
Rt+1 ´ (1 + rt+1)(1 + ¼t+1)¡ 1; (5)
­t ´ wtlyt ¡ zyt +
1
1 + rt+1
¡
wt+1l
o
t+1 ¡ zot+1
¢
: (6)
The individual chooses (cyt ;mt; c
o
t+1) to maximize (1) subject to (4) and hence the
optimal conditions are
u0(cyt ) = (1 + rt+1)µu
0(cot+1); (7)
v0(mt)
u0(cyt )
=
Rt+1
1 +Rt+1
: (8)
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Equations (4), (7) and (8) yield the following demand functions:
cyt = c
y(­t; rt+1; Rt+1); (9)
mt = m(­t; rt+1; Rt+1); (10)
cot+1 = c
o(­t; rt+1; Rt+1); (11)
where 0 < cy­ < 1; m­ > 0; mR < 0:
See Appendix A for the abovementioned properties of the demand functions.
The ¯rm sector has the following production function:
yt = F (kt; lt); satisfying Fk > 0; Fkk < 0; Fl > 0; Fll < 0; Fkl ¸ 0; (12)
where kt and lt are inputs of capital and labor respectively. Physical capital depreciation
is assumed away, for simplicity. Since Pt and Wt are ¯xed in the relevant periods, which
leads to shortages of commodity demand and labor demand, the ¯rm sector minimizes
the total cost of producing output yt and then
Fk(kt; lt)
rt
=
Fl(kt; lt)
wt
> 1:
This equation gives kt as a function of lt; rt and wt:
kt = k(lt; rt; wt); where kl > 0; kr < 0; kw > 0: (13)
Because of the shortage of commodity demand the ¯rm increases neither kt nor lt although
the marginal productivity of each input exceeds each price, and hence the ¯rm value ºt
is strictly positive. Since k is given by (13), the dynamics of º is
ºt+1 = (1 + rt)ºt ¡ F (k(lt; rt; wt); lt) + rtk(lt; rt; wt) + wtlt: (14)
In the presence of labor demand shortage we have to assume a rule of job allocation
between the young (lyt ) and the old (l
o
t ). It is
lyt = l
y(lt); l
o
t = lt ¡ ly(lt); where 0 < lyl · 1: (15)
Substituting (5), (9), (13) and (15) into (2) leads to
wtl
y(lt)¡ zyt = cy (­t; rt+1; (1 + rt+1)(1 + ¼t+1)¡ 1)
+mt + bt+1 + k(lt+1; rt+1; wt+1) + ºt+1: (16)
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From (5), (6), (10), and (15) we ¯nd rt+1 and ­t to satisfy
mt = m (­t; rt+1; (1 + rt+1)(1 + ¼t+1)¡ 1) ; (17)
­t = wtl
y(lt)¡ zyt +
1
1 + rt+1
©
wt+1 [lt+1 ¡ ly(lt+1)]¡ zot+1
ª
:
These two equations solve rt+1 and ­t as functions of lt and lt+1 for given price parameters
Ps and Ws for s = t; t + 1, and policy parameters Mt, z
y
t and z
o
t+1. Applying them into
(16) gives lt+1 as a function of lt and ºt+1. Shifting (14) by one period and applying rt+1
obtained from (17) into the result gives ºt+2 as a function of lt, ºt+1 and lt+1, where lt+1
has already been given as a function of lt and ºt+1. Therefore, lt+1 and ºt+2 are represented
as functions of lt and ºt+1 {i.e., l and º formulate an autonomous dynamics. Note that we
consider the case where nominal prices and wages are ¯xed and so are (wt; wt+1; ¼t+1;mt)
in the relevant periods.
Totally di®erentiating the dynamics of l and º gives e®ects of bond issuance bt+1 and
tax burdens zyt and z
o
t+1 on the dynamic paths of l and º:
At
0@ dlt+1
dºt+2
1A = Bt
0@ dlt
dºt+1
1A+ Ct
0BBB@
dbt+1
dzyt
dzot+1
1CCCA ; (18)
where
At ´
0@ ®t³t¡¯t²t³t ¡¯t³t
°t³t¡±t²t
³t
¡ ±t
³t
1A ;
Bt ´
0@¡(1¡ cy­t)wtlylt ³t¡(1+rt+1)¯t³t
m­twtl
y
lt
¡ (1+rt+1)±t
³t
1A ;
Ct ´
0@ 1 1¡ cy­t ¡ cy­t1+rt+1
0 ¡m­t ¡ m­t1+rt+1
1A :
8
®t ´ ¡
cy­twt+1(1¡ lylt+1)
1 + rt+1
¡ klt+1 (< 0);
¯t ´ ¡
cy­t(wt+1l
o
t+1 ¡ zot+1)
(1 + rt+1)2
+ cyrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)c
y
Rt+1
+ krt+1 ;
°t ´ ¡
m­twt+1(1¡ lylt+1)
1 + rt+1
(< 0);
±t ´ ¡m­t(wt+1l
o
t+1 ¡ zot+1)
(1 + rt+1)2
+mrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)mRt+1 ;
²t ´ (Fkt+1 ¡ rt+1)klt+1 + Flt+1 ¡ wt+1 (> 0);
³t ´ ºt+1 + kt+1 ¡ (Fkt+1 ¡ rt+1)krt+1 (> 0):
3 No Burden on Future Generations
Given that initially there is no public debt, this section considers the case where the
government issues bonds to ¯nance ¯scal spending in period T and repays them by taxing
on the old and/or the young in period T+1 so that the original path is recovered in period
T + 2 and after. Section 4 treats the case where a tax is imposed also on the generation
born in period T + 2 but not on the generations born afterwards.
The government unanticipatedly issues bonds dbT+1(> 0) in period T in order to
¯nance government purchases dgT (¸ 0) and subsidy ¡dzoT (¸ 0) to the old, and in period
T + 1 taxes dzoT+1(¸ 0) on the old and dzyT+1(¸ 0) on the young so as to redeem the
bonds. That is,
fdbtg1t=0 = (0; :::; 0; dbT+1; 0; :::; 0); (19)
dbT+1 = dgT ¡ dzoT ; (20)
dzyT+1 + dz
o
T+1 = (1 + rT+1)dbT+1: (21)
Furthermore, in order to focus on the pure e®ect of bond issuance on the generations
born in periods T and T +1, we consider the bond issuance and the subsequent taxation
that do not a®ect the utility levels of the generations born in period t 2 [T + 2;1].
Formally, in period T + 1 the tax-cum-subsidy on the young dzyT+1 is adjusted lest the
dynamic path should change from the original one in the subsequent periods t 2 [T+2;1].
Therefore, we substitute dlT+2 = 0 and dºT+3 = 0 into the dynamics (18) for t = T + 1
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and thereby ¯nd such dzyT+1 to satisfy0@¡(1¡ cy­T+1)
m­T+1
1A dzyT+1 = BT+1
0@ dlT+1
dºT+2
1A ;
which reduces to
dzyT+1 = wT+1l
y
lT+1
dlT+1; dºT+2 = 0: (22)
The implication is straightforward. If in period T + 1 the government levies a 100%
tax on the additional labor income of the young that is created by ¯scal expansion (i.e.,
dzyT+1 = wT+1l
y
lT+1
dlT+1), the budget of the young is una®ected. Thus, in the subsequent
periods employment and the ¯rm value remain unchanged (i.e., dlt = 0 and dºt+1 = 0 for
t 2 [T + 2;1]).
3.1 No Burden on Children
Public debt is widely believed to place a burden on children by generating an income
transfer from them to their parents. Theoretical studies, such as Diamond (1965), Blan-
chard (1985) and Weil (1989), support this view in the case of full employment. We in
contrast treat the case of Keynesian unemployment and ¯nd that such burdens do not
arise.
Because (19){(22) imply no welfare e®ect on the generations born in period t 2 [T +
2;1], we can obtain the pure welfare e®ect on the children (viz., the generation born in
period T ) of bond issuance by assuming the following policy:
Policy 1. Public debt is fully redeemed by taxing on the old in period T +1, {i.e., dzoT+1 =
(1 + rT+1)dbT+1(> 0) and dz
y
T+1 = 0.
Under (19){(22) and Policy 1 a unique consistent equilibrium obtains as follows:0@ dlT
dºT+1
1A =
0B@ 1wT lylT
0
1CA dbT+1;
0@ dlt
dºt+1
1A =
0@ 0
0
1A for 8t 2 [T + 1;1]: (23)
The period-T value of the additional tax imposed on the children when they are old is
1
1+rT+1
dzoT+1 = dbT+1. If full employment holds, it makes the children worse o® since
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there is no room for employment expansion. However, in the presence of involuntary
unemployment ¯scal expansion ¯nanced by bond issuance stimulates aggregate demand
and increases employment since from (12) and (23) where kT is predetermined we derive
dyT = FlT
1
wT l
y
lT
dbT+1; dlT =
1
wT l
y
lT
dbT+1:
Accordingly, the children earn additional labor income that exactly o®sets the additional
tax since (15) and the second equation above give
wTdl
y
T = wT l
y
lT
dlT = dbT+1:
This result implies that the children's welfare is not a®ected by the bond issuance.
The formal proof is as follows. Since from (23) dlT+1 = 0, dºT+2 = 0 and dºT+1 = 0 and
prices are invariant in the relevant periods, (14) in which t = T + 1 and (17) in which
t = T respectively yield
drT+1 =
²T
³T
dlT+1 +
1
³T
dºT+2 ¡ 1 + rT+1
³T
dºT+1 = 0;
d­T =¡
mrT+1 + (1 + ¼T+1)mRT+1
m­T
drT+1 = 0;
d¼T+1 =0:
Therefore, from (1), (5), and (9){(11) we derive
dcyT = 0; dc
o
T+1 = 0; dUT = 0:
In sum, the parents (viz., the generation born in period T ¡1) receive income through
either transfers or government purchases and use it up before they die (i.e., within period
T ).7 Hence, in the presence of Keynesian unemployment their children de¯nitely enjoy an
increase in labor income that exactly o®sets the tax burden due to public bonds. From
the second property of (23) with Policy 1, there is obviously no welfare e®ect on the
grandchildren (viz., the generation born in period T + 1). We summarize this result in
the following proposition:
7As analyzed in Barro (1974), if the current generation chooses to bequeath a legacy to future gen-
erations due to altruistic motives, the Ricardian equivalence holds and an issue of public debt has no
e®ect.
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Proposition 1. Under (19){(22) and Policy 1 public debt places no burden on future
generations.
Remark 1. If government purchases are used to build facilities that yield utility for future
generations, they are better o® by the magnitude of the utility.
Note that Policy 1 improves the welfare of the parents. To show it we combine (3)
and (14) and obtain
coT =
1
1 + ¼T
mT¡1 + (1 + rT ) bT + kT + ºT+1 + F (kT ; lT )¡ wT lT + wT [lT ¡ ly(lT )]¡ zoT ;
where kT is predetermined. Totally di®erentiating this equation and applying (1), (20)
and (23) into the result yields
dcoT =
£
(FlT ¡ wT ) + wT
¡
1¡ lylT
¢¤
dlT ¡ dzoT (24)
=
FlT ¡ wT lylT
wT l
y
lT
dgT ¡ FlT
wT l
y
lT
dzoT > 0;
dUT¡1 = µu0(coT )dc
o
T > 0:
An increase in aggregate employment makes the parents better o® since it raises not only
the value of equities held by them but also their wage earnings. Those two e®ects are
represented by the ¯rst and the second term of the coe±cient of dlT in (24), respectively.
Direct transfer ¡dzoT (> 0) obviously bene¯ts them. Thus, Policy 1 makes them better
o®. The two expressions of dcoT in (24) imply that the welfare of the parents increases as
the marginal expansion of their employment (1 ¡ lylT ) is larger, and that they receive a
larger gain from direct transfer ¡dzoT than from government purchases dgT .
3.2 Tax on Grandchildren
We have so far considered the case where all the tax burden due to public debt rests
on children. This section examines the case that a part of it is placed on grandchildren,
which is broadly believed to make them worse o®. To address this issue we consider the
following policy in place of Policy 1 in the context of (19){(22):
Policy 2. Public debt is redeemed by taxing on both the old and the young in period T +1:
dzyT+1 + dz
o
T+1 = (1 + rT+1)dbT+1(> 0), dz
o
T+1 ¸ 0, and dzyT+1 > 0.
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Note that this policy can be interpreted as a combination of Policy 1 and an income
transfer from grandchildren to children in period T + 1.
Under (19){(22) and Policy 2 we have a unique consistent equilibrium that satis¯es0@ dlT+1
dºT+2
1A =
0B@ 1wT+1lylT+1
0
1CA dzyT+1;
0@ dlt
dºt+1
1A =
0@ 0
0
1A for t 2 [T + 2;1]: (25)
With full employment the additional tax makes the grandchildren worse o® by raising
the children's consumption. In the presence of unemployment, however, the rise in the
children's consumption increases the grandchildren's employment in period T + 1. From
(15) and (25), the additional labor income of the grandchildren is
wT+1dl
y
T+1 = wT+1l
y
lT+1
dlT+1 = dz
y
T+1;
which exactly o®sets their tax burden. Consequently, the grandchildren's welfare is un-
a®ected whereas the children's welfare increases: The same mechanism as Proposition 1
works in period T + 1. While the formal proof is given in Appendix B, this property is
summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. Under (19){(22) and Policy 2 public debt issuance makes the generation
born in period T better o® and the generations born in period T +1 and after unchanged.
Thus, there is no burden on future generations.
Remark 2. The larger the marginal expansion of children's employment (1¡ lylT+1) is, the
greater their welfare is.
As for the parents' welfare, in Appendix C we obtain dcoT and dUT¡1:
dcoT =
FlT ¡ wT lylT
wT l
y
lT
dgT ¡ FlT
wT l
y
lT
dzoT +
©T
(1 + rT+1)wT l
y
lT
¤T
dzyT+1 R 0;
dUT¡1 = µu0(coT )dc
o
T R 0;
where ¤T is positive but ©T can be positive or negative. Thus, public debt may or may
not make the parents worse o®.8
8Rankin (1986, pp. 497{498) imposes saddle-point stability and some other assumptions to show that
public debt issuance raises output and welfare in steady state. Diamond (1965) also assumes saddle-
point stability to show that public debt burden arises under full employment. Similarly, we need some
assumptions to show that public debt issuance makes the current generation better o®.
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4 De¯cit-Covering Bonds
This section examines the implication of de¯cit-covering bonds issued to redeem bonds.
The amount of public bonds is zero for any point in time on the original path and is
unanticipatedly increased in period T by dbT+1(> 0) to ¯nance government purchases
and transfers to the old. Additional bonds are issued in period T + 1 by dbT+2(> 0) to
cover ¯scal de¯cits and are redeemed in period T +2 by collecting taxes from the old and
the young. That is,
fdbtg1t=0 = (0; :::; 0; dbT+1; dbT+2; 0; :::; 0); (26)
dbT+1 = dgT ¡ dzoT ; (27)
dbT+2 + dz
y
T+1 + dz
o
T+1 = (1 + rT+1)dbT+1; (28)
dzyT+2 + dz
o
T+2 = (1 + rT+2)dbT+2: (29)
To focus on the pure e®ect of the additional bond issuance on the future generations,
this section assumes that the tax-cum-subsidy on the young dzyT+2 is adjusted in period
T + 2 lest the dynamic system for subsequent period t 2 [T + 3;1] should change from
the original one. Such dzyT+2 is obtained by substituting dlT+3 = 0 and dºT+4 = 0 into
the dynamics (18) for t = T + 2:
dzyT+2 = wT+2l
y
lT+2
dlT+2; dºT+3 = 0: (30)
In addition, this section imposes the following policy to obtain the pure welfare e®ect
of the additional bond issuance.
Policy 3. Public debt is redeemed by taxing on only the old in period T + 2: dzoT+2 =
(1 + rT+2)dbT+2(> 0) and dz
y
T+2 = 0.
Under (26){(30) and Policy 3, additional bond issuance yields a tax burden on the
grandchildren when they are old whereas there is no welfare e®ect on the generations born
14
in period t 2 [T + 2;1]. The consistent equilibrium must satisfy0@ dlT+1
dºT+2
1A =
0B@ 1wT+1lylT+1
0
1CA¡dbT+2 + dzyT+1¢ ; (31)
0@ dlt
dºt+1
1A =
0@ 0
0
1A for t 2 [T + 2;1]:
By comparing (25) and (31) we ¯nd that the implication of Proposition 2 is valid in
Proposition 3 and that de¯cit-covering bonds play exactly the same role as the tax on the
grandchildren when young (dzyT+1). Issuing additional bonds in period T + 1 generates
an income transfer from the grandchildren to the children in the form of tax reduction
and the children increase consumption. Since the children use up all the gains before they
die (i.e., within period T + 1), the grandchildren de¯nitely receive the additional income
that exactly covers the additional tax burden. Thus, the welfare of the grandchildren is
una®ected by the additional bond issuance whereas the children are better o®.
We summarize the above result in the following:
Proposition 3. Under (26){(30) and Policy 3, issuance of de¯cit-covering bonds en-
hances the welfare of the generation born in period T while leaving unchanged the welfare
of the generations born in period T + 1 and after. Public debt thus places no burden on
future generations.
The welfare e®ect on the parents is ambiguous for the same reason as discussed below
Proposition 2.9 If public bonds are permanently rolled over, Rankin's (1986) result on
the steady-state welfare is duplicated.10 Rankin imposes some conditions to show that a
permanent increase in public debt raises the steady-state welfare. In contrast, we show
that bond issuance always places no burden on future generations while it may or may
not make the current generation better o®. This result is consistent with Rankin's since
the e®ect on the steady-state welfare is a mixture of the two.
9See Appendix C for the formal proof.
10As already mentioned in Footnote 3, we explicitly introduce equities whereas Rankin (1986) assumes
that the ownership of ¯rms is always in the hands of the old. Thus, there is a slight di®erence between
the results of the two.
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5 Conclusion
Government purchases and transfers to the present generation ¯nanced by public debt
issuance require additional taxes on future generations and thereby make them worse
o® as long as full employment always holds, as shown in the literature. If there are
demand shortages and involuntary unemployment at least in the periods in which bonds
are issued and redeemed, however, the future generations who are taxed to redeem the
bonds earn a large enough wage income to cover the additional tax burden while the
economic situations of the subsequent generations are una®ected. Thus, there is no debt
burden on future generations. This result still holds even if de¯cit-covering bonds are
issued and the additional taxes are imposed on yet unborn generations.
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Appendices
Appendix A The Property of Demand Functions
This appendix derives the properties of demand functions (9){(11). Totally di®erentiating
(4), (7) and (8) yields
cy­t =
1
¡t
> 0;
cyrt+1 =
u0(cot+1)
¡t(1 + rt+1)2u00(cot+1)
·
1¡
µ
¡u
00(cot+1)c
o
t+1
u0(cot+1)
¶¸
;
cyRt+1 = ¡
v0(mt)
¡t(1 +Rt+1)2v00(mt)
·
1¡
µ
¡v
00(mt)mt
v0(mt)
¶¸
;
m­t = ¢tc
y
­t
> 0;
mrt+1 = ¢tc
y
rt+1
;
mRt+1 = ¢t
·
cyRt+1 +
v0(mt)
R2t+1u
00(cyt )
¸
=
m­tv
0(mt)
(1 +Rt+1)2
·
¡ mt
v0(mt)
+
(1 +Rt+1)
2
R2t+1u
00(cyt )
+
(1 +Rt+1)
2
(1 + rt+1)2R2t+1µu
00(cot+1)
¸
< 0;
where
¡t ´ 1 + R
2
t+1u
00(cyt )
(1 +Rt+1)2v00(mt)
+
u00(cyt )
(1 + rt+1)2µu00(cot+1)
> 1;
¢t ´ Rt+1u
00(cyt )
(1 +Rt+1)v00(mt)
> 0:
Hence, we have
1¡ cy­t =
¡t ¡ 1
¡t
> 0;
¡ cy­t
£
mrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)mRt+1
¤
+m­t
h
cyrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)c
y
Rt+1
i
= ¡(1 + ¼t+1)m­tv
0(mt)
R2t+1u
00(cyt )
> 0:
(A.1)
Appendix B The Proof of Proposition 2
Because dzyT = 0 and dz
o
T+1 = (1+ rT+1)dbT+1¡ dzyT+1 from (20) and (21), the dynamics
given by (18) for t = T is
AT
0@ dlT+1
dºT+2
1A = BT
0@ dlT
dºT+1
1A+
0@ 1¡ cy­T cy­T1+rT+1
¡m­T m­T1+rT+1
1A0@ dbT+1
dzyT+1
1A :
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Under (19){(22) and Policy 2 we have a unique consistent equilibrium0@ dlT
dºT+1
1A =
0B@ 1wT lylT
0
1CA dbT+1 + 1
wT+1l
y
lT+1
DTdz
y
T+1;
0@ dlT+1
dºT+2
1A =
0B@ 1wT+1lylT+1
0
1CA dzyT+1; (A.2)
0@ dlt
dºt+1
1A =
0@ 0
0
1A for t 2 [T + 2;1];
where
Dt ´ B¡1t
0@ ¡ cy­twt+1lylt+11+rt+1 + ®t³t¡¯t²t³t
¡m­twt+1l
y
lt+1
1+rt+1
+ °t³t¡±t²t
³t
1A :
Since the utility levels of the generations born in period t 2 [T +1;1] are not a®ected
by bond issuance under (19){(22) and Policy 2, it is su±cient to examine only the welfare
e®ect on the children. Linearizing (14) in which t = T + 1 and applying (A.2) to the
result yields
drT+1 =
²T
³T
dlT+1 +
1
³T
dºT+2 ¡ 1 + rT+1
³T
dºT+1 (A.3)
= ¡ FlT+1 + (1 + FkT+1)klT+1
wT+1l
y
lT+1
h
(1+RT+1)u0(coT+1)
RT+1(1+rT+1)u00(coT+1)
+ (1 + FkT+1)krT+1
idzyT+1 > 0;
where ²T and ³T are given below (18). From (17) we obtain
d­T = ¡
mrT+1 + (1 + ¼T+1)mRT+1
m­T
drT+1:
Equations (5), (9) and the above equation lead to
dcyT = c
y
­T
d­T +
h
cyrT+1 + (1 + ¼T+1)c
y
RT+1
i
drT+1 (A.4)
=
¡cy­t
£
mrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)mRt+1
¤
+m­t
h
cyrt+1 + (1 + ¼t+1)c
y
Rt+1
i
m­T
drT+1 > 0;
where the sign of the numerator is given by (A.1). Since u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, from (7),
(A.3) and (A.4) we obtain
dcoT+1 =
u00(cyT )
(1 + rT+1)µu00(coT+1)
dcyT ¡
u0(coT+1)
(1 + rT+1)u00(coT+1)
drT+1 > 0: (A.5)
18
Accordingly, (1), (A.4) and (A.5) give
dUT = u
0(cyT )dc
y
T + µu
0(coT+1)dc
o
T+1 > 0:
Since a decrease in lylT+1 raises drT+1 given by (A.3), it increases dc
y
T in (A.4) and dc
o
T+1
in (A.5) and hence increases dUT , implying Remark 2.
Appendix C TheWelfare E®ect of Public Debt on Parents under
(19){(22) and Policy 2
This appendix shows that the welfare e®ect of public debt on parents depends on the
signs of dºT+1 and dlT , which are ambiguous. Totally di®erentiating (14) where t = T +1
and substituting (25) into the result gives
dºT+1 =
²T
1 + rT+1
dlT+1 +
1
1 + rT+1
dºT+2 ¡ ³T
1 + rT+1
drT+1 (A.6)
=
²T
(1 + rT+1)wT+1l
y
lT+1
dzyT+1 ¡
³T
1 + rT+1
drT+1;
where ²T (> 0) and ³T (> 0) are given below (18). An income transfer from the grandchil-
dren to the children, dzyT+1 > 0, directly increases labor employment dlT+1 and ¯rm value
dºT+1. It also raises the interest rate (as shown in (A.3)), which in turn reduces dºT+1.
Accordingly, the total e®ect on dºT+1 is ambiguous. In fact, substituting (A.3) into (A.6)
yields
dºT+1 =
£T
(1 + rT+1)¤T
dzyT+1 R 0; (A.7)
where
£T ´
£
(FkT+1 ¡ rT+1)klT+1 + (FlT+1 ¡ wT+1)
¤
(1 +RT+1)c
o
T+1
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
¡ (FlT+1 ¡ wT+1)krT+1 ¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0;
¤T ´ ¡wT+1lylT+1
·
(1 +RT+1)u
0(coT+1)
RT+1(1 + rT+1)u00(coT+1)
+ (1 + FkT+1)krT+1
¸
> 0:
Note that this is the same as dºT+1 given in (A.2). The denominator of (A.7) is positive
and thus the sign of £T determines the sign of dºT+1.
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Totally di®erentiating (16) where t = T and substituting (20), (25), and (A.6) into
the result generates
dlT =
¡®T
(1¡ cy­T )wT lylT
dlT+1 +
1
(1¡ cy­T )wT lylT
dºT+1 +
¯T
(1¡ cy­T )wT lylT
drT+1
+
1
wT l
y
lT
dbT+1 +
cy­T
(1¡ cy­T )(1 + rT+1)wT lylT
dzyT+1
=
1
wT l
y
lT
(dgT ¡ dzoT ) +
wT+1l
y
lT+1
cy­T ¡ (1 + rT+1)®T + ²T
(1¡ cy­T )(1 + rT+1)wT lylTwT+1lylT+1
dzyT+1
+
(1 + rT+1)¯T ¡ ³T
(1¡ cy­T )(1 + rT+1)wT lylT
drT+1;
where ®T (< 0), ¯T , ²T (> 0), and ³T (> 0) are given below (18). Thus, while the income
transfer from the grandchildren to the children directly increases labor employment dlT ,
it also raises the interest rate (see (A.3)), which makes the e®ect on dlT ambiguous. In
fact, substituting (A.3) into the above equation gives
dlT =
1
wT l
y
lT
(dgT ¡ dzoT ) +
¥T
(1 + rT+1)wT l
y
lT
¤T
dzyT+1 R 0; (A.8)
where
¥T ´
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
cyT
RT+1
µ
¡ u
0(cyT )
u00(cyT )c
y
T
¶
+
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + (FlT+1 ¡ wT+1)
¤
(1 +RT+1)c
o
T+1
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
+ wT+1(1 + FlT+1)krT+1 ¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0:
Note that this is the same as dlT given in (A.2). Under (19){(22) and Policy 2, dz
y
T+1 is
in the following range:
0 < dzyT+1 · (1 + rT+1)dbT+1 = (1 + rT+1)(dgT ¡ dzoT ):
If ¥T is positive, public debt issuance unambiguously increases labor employment dlT . If
¥T is negative, in the case of dz
y
T+1 = (1 + rT+1)(dgT ¡ dzoT ), dlT takes its lower bound
(d^lT ) and may become negative. It is given by
d^lT =
¨T
wT l
y
lT
¤T
(dgT ¡ dzoT );
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where
¨T ´
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
cyT
RT+1
µ
¡ u
0(cyT )
u00(cyT )c
y
T
¶
+
n
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 +
h
FlT+1 ¡ wT+1(1¡ lylT+1)
io
(1 +RT+1)c
o
T+1
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
+ wT+1(1¡ lylT+1)(1 + FlT+1)krT+1 ¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0:
If ¨T is positive, the total e®ect on dlT is always positive. If ¨T is negative, d^lT is negative
and thus the total e®ect on dlT is ambiguous depending on the magnitude of dz
y
T+1.
From (1), (3), (14), (A.7), and (A.8), we obtain
dcoT = dºT+1 +
£
(FlT ¡ wT ) + wT
¡
1¡ lylT
¢¤
dlT ¡ dzoT (A.9)
=
FlT ¡ wT lylT
wT l
y
lT
dgT ¡ FlT
wT l
y
lT
dzoT +
©T
(1 + rT+1)wT l
y
lT
¤T
dzyT+1 R 0;
dUT¡1 = µu0(coT )dc
o
T R 0;
where
©T ´
(FlT ¡ wT lylT )
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
cyT
RT+1
µ
¡ u
0(cyT )
u00(cyT )c
y
T
¶
+ ÁT
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
+
£
FlTwT+1(1 + FkT+1)¡ wT lylTFlT+1(1 + rT+1)
¤
krT+1
¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)FlT
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0;
ÁT ´
£
FlT (1 + FkT+1)¡ wT lylT (1 + rT+1)
¤
klT+1 + FlT (FlT+1 ¡ wT+1)
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
£
(1 +RT+1)coT+1
¤¡1 > 0:
If ©T is positive, public debt issuance is unambiguously bene¯cial to parents. If ©T is
negative, the case of dzyT+1 = (1 + rT+1)(dgT ¡ dzoT ) gives the lower bound of dcoT ( ^dcoT ),
which may become negative. It is given by
^dcoT =
ªgT
wT l
y
lT
¤T
dgT ¡ ª
z
T
wT l
y
lT
¤T
dzoT ;
where
ªgT ´
(FlT ¡ wT lylT )
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
cyT
RT+1
µ
¡ u
0(cyT )
u00(cyT )c
y
T
¶
+ ÃgcT
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
¡ ÃgkT krT+1 ¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)FlT
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0;
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ÃgcT ´
£
FlT (1 + FkT+1)¡ wT lylT (1 + rT+1)
¤
klT+1 + FlT (FlT+1 ¡ wT+1) + wT+1lylT+1(FlT ¡ wT lylT )
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
£
(1 +RT+1)coT+1
¤¡1 > 0;
ÃgkT ´ wT lylT
h
(FlT+1 ¡ wT+1lylT+1) + wT+1FkT+1(1¡ lylT+1)
i
¡ FlTwT+1(1¡ lylT+1)(1 + FkT+1) R 0;
and
ªzT ´
(FlT ¡ wT lylT )
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
cyT
RT+1
µ
¡ u
0(cyT )
u00(cyT )c
y
T
¶
+ ÃzcT
µ
¡ u
0(coT+1)
u00(coT+1)c
o
T+1
¶
¡ ÃzkT krT+1 ¡ (ºT+1 + kT+1)FlT
£
(1 + FkT+1)klT+1 + FlT+1
¤
R 0;
ÃzcT ´
£
FlT (1 + FkT+1)¡ wT lylT (1 + rT+1)
¤
klT+1 + FlT [FlT+1 ¡ wT+1(1¡ lylT+1)]
RT+1(1 + rT+1)
£
(1 +RT+1)coT+1
¤¡1 > 0;
ÃzkT ´ wT lylTFlT+1(1 + rT+1)¡ FlTwT+1
h
(1¡ lylT+1) + FkT+1
i
R 0:
If ªgT is positive, government purchases ¯nanced by public bonds always make parents
better o®. If ªgT is negative, the total welfare e®ect of government purchases on parents
is ambiguous depending on the magnitude of dzyT+1. Similarly, the subsidy to parents
¯nanced by public bonds may or may not improve the welfare of parents depending on
the sign of ªzT and the magnitude of dz
y
T+1. Consequently, we conclude that the welfare
e®ect of public debt on parents is ambiguous under (19){(22) and Policy 2. By replacing
dzyT+1 with dbT+2+dz
y
T+1 in (A.9), we ¯nd the welfare e®ect of public debt on parents to
be ambiguous under (26){(30) and Policy 3.
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